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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEGRANDE L. BELNAP, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
in its corporate capacity, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16849 
By this action Walker Bank & Trust Company seeks 
declaratory judgment that its Trust Deed upon Appellant's 
residence is a good, valid, and subsisting lien. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Bryant H. Croft granted Respondent 
Summary Judgment on its Counterclaim for declaratory judgment. 
At the same time, the Honorable Judge Croft denied Appellant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed Appellant's complaint 
wi~h prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent disagrees with the characterization of the 
facts as set forth by Appellant. Respondent submits that 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Appellant's statement of many facts is either incomplete~ 
misleading, or both. 1 Therefore, Respondent submits the 
following more complete statement of background and facts. 
A. The Background of Litigation. 
On the 28th day of July, 1972~ Utahna P. Belnap died. 
She was survived by her four children and her husband, LeGrande 
L. Belnap. LeGrande L~ _Belnap is the plaintiff below and the 
Appellant in this action. 
At the time of Utahna P. Belnap's death the record 
title to several parcels of real property, including the 
marital abode, was in her name alone. A will which she had 
executed on May 21, 1949 and which she had deposited with the 
Trust Department of Walker Bank & Trust Company for safekeeping 
named Walker Bank & Trust Company as executor and left her 
estate to her children. LeG~ande L. Belnap was neither a 
beneficiary of a contingent beneficiary under the will. 
The foregoing situation spawned five lawsuits, includ-
ing this case now on appeal. All but one of the cases were 
initially permanently assigned together for efficiency and 
economy of proceedings. 
lThe mischaracterization begins with Appellant's 
first statement, ''The plaintiff's father and mother deeded real ' 
property to the plaintiff by Warranty Deed dated August 1951. 
(Supplemental Record p. l.)" A review of the cited record, 
however, shows that Utahna P. Belnap was also a grantee under 
the deed. Appellant's facts totally ignore that point. 
Additionally, Appellant ignores the fact that the referenced 
deed was ineffective. (See Point VII, infra.) 
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The first case arose when Walker Bank's Trust Depart-
ment filed the 1949 will of Utahna P. Belnap for probate. 
LeGrande L. Belnap contested that will. He claimed that the 
1949 will had been revoked by a later will which named him as 
executor and sole beneficiary. He alleged the later will had 
been executed in his business office and had been witnessed by 
two of his employees, the sales manger of his Ford dealership 
and his secretary, Doris Bagley, now Mrs. LeGrande L. Belnap. 
The alleged later will was never produced or found. 
The second case was a forgery and fraud case filed 
against Walker Bank and Utahna's father and siblings, LeGrande 
L. Belnap v. Walker Bank & Trust Company and Newman Petty, 
Rachel Lunt, Norma Strasssen, Leila Shipp, Charles B. Petty, 
personally and d/b/a Petty Investment Company, Civil No. 
209266. Count I of the case involved the marital abode 2 (the 
"Home"). Appellant claimed Walker Bank had breached a duty to 
record a prior deed to him and Utahna as joint tenants. He 
also claimed that Walker Bank and other defendants had 
conspired to deprive him of his interest in the home by 
obtaining and causing to be recorded a forged warranty deed 
which conveyed title to Utahna P. Belnap alone. Four other 
2All of Lot 6 Indian Hills Subdivision, Plat B-1 
according to the official plat thereof. 
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counts of the Complaint charged the other defendants, but not 
Walker Bank with certain frauds, conspiracies and conversions 
of marital property and of his property. 
The third case was this case, LeGrande L. Belnap v. 
Walker Bank & Trust Company, Civil No. 21151. Via an Amended 
Complaint he joined his four children as defendants. The 
Complaint seeks to quiet title in Appellant and to claim dam-
ages against Walker Bank for slander of title. The Complaint 
does not designate the capacity in which Walker Bank was being 
sued. At the time the Complaint was filed, Walker Bank was 
holder of a Trust Deed Note, and Trust Deed on the Horne secur-
ing the Note. The Bank was also the named executor under the 
will. At about that time Walker Bank had been appointed 
special administrator of Utahna's estate for the purpose of 
marshalling her assets (including the Horne) and preserving her 
estate during the pendency of the will contest. Consequently, 
Walker Bank entered separate appearances; in its corporate 
capacity and in its capacity as special administrator of the 
Estate of Utahna P. Belnap. 
The Bank, in its corporate capacity, counterclaimed to 
establish its trust deed as a valid and subsisting first lien 
on the property as against any claim or interest of LeGrande L. 
Belnap in the Home. 
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The fourth and fifth cases involved· certain real 
property located in Monticello, California. In them LeGrande 
L. Belnap claimed that Utahna, Newman Petty and others had 
deprived him of his interest in that property, part of which 
interest was then titled to Utahna P. Belnap. These cases do 
not now concern us except as part of the backdrop against which 
this appeal arises. 
From the numerous original claims and defendants, 
settlements and dismissals leave only this single defendant-
respondent. LeGrande's single remaining action on appeal 
herein seeks to invalidcrte the Trust Deed Note and the Trust 
Deed held by Walker. Dismissed from original affirmative 
claims in excess of $1,000,000 against the Bank, Appellant 
tenaciously seeks to avoid attachment of a Trust Deed lien upon 
3 the Home in a principal amount of $11,694.08. 
B. The Documents of Title to the Horne. 
Ostensibly on August 23, 1951, Henry Belnap and Ida L. 
Benlap, his wife; executed a warranty deed to the Horne convey-
ing it to LeGrande L. Belnap and Utahna P. Belnap as joint 
tenants. (Supplemental Record at 1.) This deed has been 
usually referred to as "the first deed". The document, 
3Exclusive of interest, costs and attorneys' fees 
expended in by upholding the Trust Deed's validity. 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
however, was notarized by an individual who declared on the 
document that his commission as a Notary Public expired January 
6, 1951. The document described the property by a metes and 
bounds description. This document was never recorded. It is 
this document upon which LeGrande L. Belnap claimed in case 
209266 and in this case. 
On August 22, 1952, a plat for Indian Hills B-1 
subdivison was recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
office. The plat included the property described in the first 
deed. It was made by Henry and Ida L. Belnap and others as 
subdividers. It was not, however, joined by LeGrande L. Belnap 
and Utahna P. Belnap. Rather, LeGrande L. Belnap notarized the 
signatures of the subdividers on the plat, all of whom together 
declared themselves to be the owners of the property described 
thereon. (Supplemental Record at 105). 
Additionally, while Lot 6 of that subidivision roughly 
coincides with the metes and bounds description, its perimeters 
are different. (See Appendix "A" to this brief.) Thus, on or 
about August 22, 1952, part of the property claimed by LeGrande 
L. Belnap pursuant to his claim under the first deed, was 
dedicated to Salt Lake City for use as a public street. 
On June 15, 1954, a deed to the Home from Henry and 
Ida L. Belnap to "Utahna P. Belnap, a married woman" was 
recorded. (Supplemental Record at 2.) It was dated November 
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10, 1952. It bore the subdivision description (Lot 6, Indian 
Hills Subdivision Plat B-1). This deed has usually been 
referred to as "the second deed". The signature of Henry 
Belnap was genuine. 4 The signature of Ida L. Belnap was 
. . 5 ingenu1ne. 
The face of the document indicates that it was 
recorded at the request of Walker Bank & Trust Company. 
Wilford Kimball, an officer of Walker Bank employed at its 
Sugarhouse Branch during 1954, states that November 10, 1952 
deed was received by the Bank from Utahna P. Belnap in connec-
tion with the negotiation of a mortgage and was recorded in the 
normal course of the mortgage transaction. This transaction 
took place on May 27, 1954. Plaintiff joined in that transac-
tion. (Affidavit of Wilford Kimball dated October 15, 1973; 
Belnap Deposition taken October 12, 1973, page 8, lines 21-23; 
Record at 80-83.) 
Three other deeds are recorded at the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's office on which Ida L. Belnap's signature is 
41eGrande L. Belnap and his handwriting expert admit 
that Henry Belnap's signature is genuine. (See Ben Garcia 
Deposition dated 12/18/73 page 24 lines 11-16, Record at 586, 
and James S. Lowrie Affidavit, dated February 1, 1974, Record 
at 176, 178. 
SAll parties and handwriting experts concede that 
Ida L. Belnap's signature on the second deed is ingenuine, but 
there is controversy as to the effect. 
-7-
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ingenuine. In each instance, the deeds convey real property 
from Henry and Ida L. Belnap to strangers to this litigation. 
In each instance the signature of Ida L. Belnap was made by 
Henry Belnap. 6 
The 1954 mortgage on the property was extended on 
December 11, 1962. Appellant jointed in that transaction. 
(LeGrande L. Belnap Deposition dated October 12, 1973, page 10, 
line 23, page 11, line 8; Record at 585.) On May 3, 1963, the 
outstanding balance on the mortgage was $4,702.68. On that 
date Utahna P. Belnap executed a Trust Deed and a Trust Deed 
Note in favor of Walker Bank. Walker Bank loaned to Utahna P. 
Belnap the sum of $30,000.00. Of this sum, $4,702.68 was 
credited to the prior mortgage on which Appellant and Utahna P. 
Belnap were obligated, paying it in its entirety. The balance 
of the sum loaned was credited to accounts maintained by Utahna 
P. Belnap. The unpaid balance of the Trust Deed Note as of 
January 23, 1974 was $18,460.42, exclusive of Attorneys' fees 
and costs of collection. (Stephen Goalen Affidavit dated 
January 23, 1974; Record at 154-162.) 
6Henry Belnap wrote the signature of Ida L. Belnap 
on the second deed as well as on other recorded documents 
according to Leslie King, handwriting expert. (Leslie King 
Affidavit, dated 2/1/74; Record at 179-80.) 
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Appellant has acknowledged having purchased other real 
property which he placed in Utahna's name alone. He said the 
purpose was "to give her as much protection as possible." 
(Deposition of LeGrande L. Belnap, June 24, 1975, p. 8.) 7 
C. The Disposition of the Other Cases. 
The will contest was settled by agreement of all the 
beneficiaries and heirs of Utahna with approval of the court. 
The parties to the settlement were LeGrande L. Belnap and the 
children of Utahna P. Belnap. (Record at 661-669.) Walker 
Bank was not a party to the agreement in any capacity. The 
value of the property division between LeGrande and the 
children was roughly equivalent to an intestate treatment of 
Utahna's estate. As between LeGrande L. Belnap and Utahna P. 
Belnap's other heirs, the other cases were settled in connec-
tion with the will contest settlement. Thus, the children were 
settled out of this case and the Montebello cases were settled. 
The settlements granted the Home to LeGrande L. Belnap 
so far as the other heirs were concerned. The other heirs, 
7The original deposition was never returned to the 
district court. During summary judgment arguments, the absence 
was noticed. Respondent supplied both the court and the judge 
with copies of its copy. Appellant was to have read, signed 
and returned the copy but apparently has not. The court relied 
on its copy of the deposition in its memorandum opinion. (See 
Record at 541-542.) For purpose of full review, Respondent has 
filed its originally notarized copy of the deposition with the 
clerk of this court. 
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however, received an assurance from LeGrand L. Belnap that they 
and Utahna's estate would be held harmless from any claim by 
Walker Bank on the Trust Deed Note which Utahna gave the Bank 
on May 3, 1963. (Record at 661-669.) 
Walker Bank's duty as Special Administrator of the 
Estate of Utahna P. Belnap was to secure and preserve the 
estate for the benefit of the heirs until the will contest was 
terminated and an executor or administrator could be named. 
Consequently, when agreement was reached between all the poten-
tial heirs, the Special Adminstrator accepted such resolution. 
Case No. 209166, the forgery and fraud case instituted 
by LeGrande L. Belnap, was not settled. It was involuntarily 
dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with prior 
orders of the court on July 6, 1978, (Supplemental Record at 
124). The dismissal was appealed, but LeGrande L. Belnap 
voluntarily dismissed the appeal. (See Remittiter issued 
1-4-79, Docket No. 15985, Supplemental Record at 154.) The 
dismissal of Case No. 298266 is significant because Walker Bank 
as Respondent in .this case claims res judicata effect from that 
dismissal. (See Point I, infra. at pp. 11-16). 
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This case came on for pre-trial on September 10, 
1979. 8 Since both sides had motions for summary judgment on 
file, the court suggested that the motions be heard prior to 
beginning the trial. Both sides agreed. After an opportunity 
for preparation summary judgment motions were heard on 
September 11, 1979. The court took the matter under 
advisement. On November 5, 1979 the court granted summary 
judgment to Walker Bank & Trust Company. 
There are other facts which are germain to each of the 
separate arguments. They will be set out in the arguments 
which follow. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BOTH APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT AND HIS DEFENSE TO THE 
BANK'S COUNTERCLAIM ARE BARRED BY THE OPERATION 
OF THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA. 
A. The Doctrine Generally. 
The doctrine of res judicata bars Appellant's present 
complaint against the Bank. The dismissal with prejudice in 
the ~orgery and fraud case, Belnap v. Walker Bank & Trust 
Company, et al., Civil No. 209266, operated as an adjudication 
8Trial was set for September 10, 1979. At pretrial 
settlement conference it was determined that counsel and the 
trial judge would utilize the first day set for trial to 
delineate issues which would shorten and simplify the actual 
trial - an informal pretrial. 
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on the merits as to the issue of the validity of the Banks 
Trust Deed. Such a result is mandated by the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 4l(b): 
Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For 
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or comply 
with these rules or any Order of court, a defen-
dant may move for a dismissal of an action, or of 
any claim against him . . . Unless the Court in 
its Order for Dismissal otherwise specifies, a 
dismissal under this subdivision and any dismTs-
sal not provided for in this rule, oth~r than a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for impro-
per venue or for lack of an indispensible party, 
operates as an adjudication on the merits. 
(Emphasis Added) . 
Although the forgery case and this action have 
substantially identical issues with respect to the Bank in its 
corporate capacity, this Court's narrow construction of a 
plaintiff's right after dismissal recognizes even a broader 
application of res judicata. Thus, in Belliston v. Texaco, 
Inc., 521 P.2d 379 (Utah 1974), this Court reiterated its 
previous holdings: 
[T]he doctrine of res judicata applie[s] not only 
to points and issues which were actually raised 
and decided in a prior action but also as to 
those that could have been adjudicated, with the 
qualification that the claim, demand, or cause be 
the same in both cases. If the parties have had 
an opportunity to present their case and judgment 
is rendered thereon, it is binding both as to 
those issues that were tried and to those that 
were triable in that proceeding, and they are 
precluded from further litigating the matter.9 
9rd, at 380. See also Thomas v. Braffet's Heirs, 6 
U. 2d. 57, 305 P.2d 507 (1956). 
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allegations of the fraud and forgery case. 11 Finally, appel-
lant's more recent pleadings on file demonstrate the similarity 
of the two cases. For example, in his January 17, 1976 
Stipulation (Record at 393), Appellant stipulated with regard 
to the then pending cases: 
This case [Case Number 211151] involves title to 
the home located at 1466 Indian Hills Drive, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. LeGrande L. Belnap claims to be 
the owner of said home. 
"The First Cause of Acton [in Case Number 209266] 
involves title to the home located at 1466 Indian 
Hills Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, a claim for 
damages and other relief. 
And, in his August 1, 1978 Objection to the Request for Trial 
Setting in this case, Appell~nt objected to the request for the 
following reasons: 
1. That plaintiff has commenced an appeal in a 
related case in the District Court under 
Civil No. ,209266, and the issues with 
respect to that case may affect the outcome, 
if the defense is available in the instant 
case. 
llrn his Reply to Counterclaim, Second Defense, 
paragraph 2, Appellant alleges: "Denies the allegations of 
Paragraph 2 and 3 of defendants' counterclaim and further 
alleges that said trust deed is void as against the claims of 
plaintiff because of the acts which are fully set forth and the 
Complaint filed by the plaintiff against the defendant on file 
with this Court under Civil No. 209266." 
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2. The issues in the case pending on appeal 
relate to the validity of a mortgage granted 
by plaintiff's former wife to the defendant, 
Walker Bank & Trust Company, in its corpor-
ate capacity. 
(Supplemental Record at 420-421) 
The Complaints, Counterclaim, Reply to Counterclaim 
and other pleadings in these cases demonstrate the identity of 
issues. In the forgery and fraud case, Appellant put into 
issue the validity of both the Bank's Trust Deed and the second 
deed conveying the home of Utahna P. Belnap alone. These 
matters are now res judicata against him. 
Likewise, Appellant's only affirmative defense to the 
Bank's counterclaim herein is conclusively established against 
him by res judicata. This follows not only under the generally 
broad application of res judicata with regard to Rule 41(b), 
but also because the specific issues in dispute here were also 
addressed in Case Number 209266. Each issue presently at bar 
was, in fact, raised and adjudicated by the forgery and fraud 
case dismissal. 
The dismissal with prejudice in Case Number 209266 
operates as an absolute bar to any assertion by Appellant in 
this case that the Bank's Trust Deed is not valid or that the 
second deed was not valid because of alleged forgery. To the 
extent that Appellant's case herein seeks to establish his 
title in derogation of the Bank's Trust Deed, he is barred by 
-15-
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the dismissal with prejudice of the earlier case. 
The proper application of res judicata fully resolves 
this appeal against Appellant and renders consideration of the 
following arguments unnecessary. 
II. APPELLANT'S PLEADINGS PRECLUDE HIS ARGUMENTS ON 
APPEAL. 
Appellant's arguments in brief, in light of his 
pleadings, compel affirmation of the lower court's summary 
judgment. In his brief, Appellant now raises various defenses 
to the Bank's Trust Deed based on: 
1) Bank's failure to comply with declaratory 
relief statute (Point I); 
2) Actions of the personal representative, 
estoppel and the "one action" rule (Point II); and 
3) he forgery of the second deed and the bank's 
notice of Appellant's interest under the first deed 
(Point III). 
The first two arguments are in the nature of affirma-
tive defenses, alleging matters which are not implicit in 
Appellant's general denials to the Bank's counterclaim. But, 
Appellant neither pleaded such matters, nor sought to amend or 
supplement his pleadings to allege such matters. Because these 
defenses were not raised in his pleadings, Appellant may not 
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now argue them. 12 
On the other hand, the third argument addresses and 
sets forth his only pleaded affirmative defense - the matters 
covered in the forgery and fraud case. Thus the familiar 
litany on page 24 of his brief: The Bank had notice of 
Appellant's interest when Appellant delivered the first deed to 
the Bank. The Bank should have known the second deed was a 
forgery and failed to protect itself. (Compare Complaint 
209266, Supplemental Record at ·2-8.) 
Even if this Court does not reaffirm its broad 
application of res judicata as·set forth in Point I supra, at 
the very least, the affirmative defense which is based on the 
pleadings of the forgery and fraud case must be determined 
against Appellant. 
Thus, because of his failure to plead the belated 
defenses, and because of the unavailability of the only defense 
pleaded, Appellant may not properly argue any of his proposed 
defenses on the appeal. Walker Bank is properly entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. 
12see Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(h); see 
Tygesen v. Magna Water Company, 13 U.2d 397, 375 P.Zd 456 
(1962). 
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III. EVEN IF ALL APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS WERE ADMITTED, 
AT THE VERY LEAST, WALKER BANK HOLDS A VALID LIEN 
ON AN UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF OF THE PROPERTY. 
Even if Appellant can somehow prevail in his claim 
under the defective deed of August 23, 1951, he cannot have the 
property free and clear. This question is settled by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of Tracy Collins Trust Co. v. Goeltz, 
5 U.Zd 350, 301 P.Zd 1086 (1956). In that case a husband and 
wife owned property in joint tenancy and jointly executed a 
mortgage on the property. Thereafter, the husband sought a 
second mortgage from another lending institution, Tracy Collins 
Trust Company. As a condition to the loan, the prospective 
lender required that the original mortgage be paid and that the 
wife join in the new mortgage to it. The husband, without the 
knowledge of the lender, signed his wife's name. In the 
lender's action to foreclose the mortgage after default, the 
wife resisted because the mortgage had been executed by the 
husband alone. 
In Tracy Collins Trust Co. v. Goeltz, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that the husband's signature was ineffective to 
mortgage the wife's interest. The Court held, however, that 
the mortgage by the husband alone severed the joint tenancy and 
created a tenancy in common. The Court further held that the 
wife was liable for, and the entire tenancy in common was 
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subject to a portion of the second mortgage. The court found 
such liability existed to the extent by which the proceeds of 
the second mortgage relieved her and her one-half of the 
property of the prior obligation. Finally the Court held that 
the husband's undivided one-half interest of the tenancy in 
common was subject to the whole amount of the unpaid balance of 
the mortgage. 
If somehow Appellant prevails on his claim under the 
August 23, 1951 deed, Tracy Collins controls this case. At the 
time of the trust deed transaction on May 3, 1963, Utahna 
Belnap had an undivided interest in joint tenancy in the 
property in question. Her trust deed transaction severed the 
joint tenancy and created a tenancy in common with Appellant, 
with each tenant having an undivided one-half interest. Her 
transaction also caused Appellant to be relieved of an 
obligation of $4,708.68 as a joint obliger on the mortgage of 
the property. Consequently, if any property passes to 
Appellant by virtue of the August 23, 1951 deed, he can only 
take an undivided one-half interest as a tenant in common and 
that he takes subject to the lien of Walker Bank & Trust 
Company in the sum of $4,708.68. 13 Furthermore, the remain-
ing undivided one-half interest in common is subject to the 
13p1us statutory interest from May 3, 1963. Utah 
Code Annotated, §15-1-1. 
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trust deed and the whole unpaid amount of the trust deed note. 
Nonetheless, Appellant says that Walker Bank's trust 
deed is void because a forged deed was used as security for a 
loan to Utahna P. Belnap. This is not the case. The Bank took 
Utahna P. Belnap's interest in the property as security for a 
loan to Utahna P. Belnap. If Walker Bank was mislead or 
mistaken as to the extent of her estate, it is still entitled 
to take that which she held at the time. Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 57-1-4. Moreover, the contrary authority which counsel 
for Appellant cites deals with situations where the deeds are 
entire foregeries. Such cases are distinguishable from the 
circumstance here. In this case one grantor's signature is 
genuine, and that granter survived the other signator. 
Moreover, the party obligating the property had a claim to it 
independently of the so called forgery. 
IV. WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY IS A PURCHASER IN 
GOOD FAITH AND FOR A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION. 
Section 57-3-3 of the Utah Code Annotated states: 
Every conveyance of real estate hereafter 
made, which shall not be recorded as provided in 
this title, shall be void as against any subse-
quent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable 
consideration of the same real estate, or any 
portion thereof, where his own conveyance shall 
be first duly recorded. 
In the case of Federal Land Bank of Berkeley v. Pace, 87 Utah 
156, 48 P.Zd 480 (1935) this Court held that the term convey-
ance in the predecessor statute to the above quoted statute 
-20-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
included mortgage liens. There would seem little doubt that it 
also includes trust deeds. 
In the case now before the Court, Walker Bank took the 
Trust Deed 'of Utahna P. Belnap as security for a trust deed 
note and loaned the sum of $30,000.00 to Utahna P. Belnap on 
May 3, 1963. At this time, Utahna P. Belnap had been the 
record owner of the property for approximately nine years and 
the Bank had no knowledge of any defect in the title. The 
Bank's trust deed was recorded on May 8, 1963. 
The deed under which Appellant claims was never 
recorded. In his forgery suit, Appellant claimed that Walker 
Bank did have notice because Appellant allegedly entrusted the 
August 23, 1951, deed to it for recording. Because of the 
dismissal with prejudice the allegation has been conclusively 
determined against him, even were it not belied by the record 
of Appellant's subsequent involvement in the Plat of the Indian 
Hills B-1 subdivision. And, in any event, at the time the Bank 
had the second deed recorded and lent money pursuant to a 
mortgage transaction the first deed was unrecordable to 
demonstrate any interest in Appellant. It was unrecordable 
both because of the defective acknowledgement and also because 
it predated the plat which was signed by the grantors. That 
plat indicated to the world that the grantors, and not 
Appellant, still claimed ownership to the property. In fact, 
even if the deed had been recorded, standing alone, it would 
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not have been notice of Appellant's alleged interest. See 
Norton v. Fuller, 68 Utah 524, 251 P. 29 (1926). Appellant has 
not met his burden of raising genuine issues respecting the 
Bank's notice of the 1951 deed, nor with the dismissal of the 
forgery case can he. The Bank is a subsequent purchaser in 
good faith and for a valuable consideration. 
V. APPELLANT MAY NOT USE THE ACTIONS OF WALKER 
BANK IN ITS CAPACITY AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRA-
TOR OR ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF UTAHNA 
P. BELNAP AS ADMISSIONS BY RESPONDENT IN ITS 
CORPORATE CAPACITY IN THIS CASE. 
In the Appellant's various actions against it, the 
Bank has participated in two capacities. The Bank has appeared 
both in its fiduciary capacity as proponent and named executor 
under a Will, and its corporate capacity as a creditor of 
Utahna Belnap and a lien holder on potential estate assets. 
In the initial stages of the probate proceedings, the 
Bank participated as the named executor under the 1949 will 
seeking formal appointment as such. Later, as Special 
Administrator and ultimately as Administrator of the estate, 
the Bank acted in a fiduciary capacity as representative of the 
estate. In this case, the Bank was sued in both capacities. 
Different law firms represented the Bank's independent 
interests. Initially, the firm of Romney, Nelson and Cassity 
appeared for the Bank in its capacity as representative of the 
-22-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
estate. (Later, the law firm of Strong & Hanni appeared for 
the Bank in its capacity as representative of the estate.) The 
Bank's present counsel represented and continues to represent 
the Bank in its corporate capacity. The distinction and 
independence of the two separate Bank persona is one of both 
form and substance. The distinction is apparent not only under 
the law, but in the handling of these cases as well. 
Under the law, the acts of the Bank in the faithful 
performance of its duties as representative of the estate are 
chargeable to the estate. A claim against the Bank who has 
faithfully performed its duty 14 is a claim against the estate 
which must indemnify it. On the other hand, a claim against 
the Bank in its corporate capacity is a claim against the 
Bank's own assets. 
The statutes and courts of Utah recognize this dis-
tinction. For example, the relevant Utah statutes provide that 
all assets held in any fiduciary capacity must be kept separate 
from the general assets from the Bank. 15 Former Utah Code 
Annotated Section 75-9-15 respecting judgments against the 
14p1aintiff stipulated to the dismissal of all of 
his claims against the Bank as Special Administrator and, 
therefore, must concede its faithful performance of its fidu-
ciary duties. 
lSutah Code Annotated §7-5-12. 
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personal representative has been interpreted by this Court to 
mean that any judgment so given must be a judgment against the 
estate assets only and that entry of said judgment against the 
personal representative personally is improper. Clayton v. 
Dinwoodey, 33 U 251, 93 P. 723, 782 (1908). 
Because of the separate and distinct nature of the 
Bank's two persona, the acts of the Bank as the representative 
of the estate are not admissions against the Bank in its corpo-
rate capacity. Such a conclusion is compelled not only by the 
general rule which requires the bank as fiduciary to represent 
the estate's interests independently of the bank's interests 
which might arise from its corporate transactions, but also by 
the record of these cases. 
In the 1976 Stipulation between Appellant and the 
heirs of the estate, the distinction was recognized. All 
claims against the Bank as representative of the estate were 
dismissed with prejudice. The claims against the Bank in its 
corporate capacity were reserved for further proceedings. The 
claim of the Bank in its corporate capacity was recognized and 
reserved. And, according to the Stipulation, Appellant agreed 
to indemnify and to hold the heirs, the estate and Walker Bank 
in its capacity as estate representative harmless from any such 
claims. 
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In the Second Point of his brief Appellant claims 
great prejudice, in that he cannot now reach the estate for 
payment of the Trust Deed indebtedness. Additionally Appellant 
seeks to impose acts which the Bank undertook as estate 
representative as admissions against the Bank in its corporate 
capacity. Appellant ignores the law, the facts and the 
record. Both Appellant's liability here and the Bank's acts 
which are complained of are in accordance with the Stipulation 
Appellant executed. That Stipulation provides in relevant part: 
(2) LeGrande L. Belnap shall receive and be 
entitled to the home located at 1466 Indian Hill 
Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, and shall take said 
home subject to the existing mortgage thereon, 
which said mortgage LeGrande L. Belnap hereby 
assumes and agrees to dischar~e and does hereby · 
indemnify and agree to save t e estate of Utahna 
P. Belnap and defendants harmless from any loss, 
damage, claims, or liability on account thereof. 
The action described in Paragraph V B shall be 
dismissed as against Walker Bank & Trust Company 
as special administrator of the estate of Utahna 
P. Belnap, deceased, and as against her children 
with prejudice, provided that the claims against 
said bank in its corporate capacity shall be 
reserved. 
(4) All property, real, personal and mixed, 
other than the home referred to in paragraph V B 
above and the Montebello property referred to in 
Paragraph V C above including, but without 
limitation, all other property shown on the 
inventory and appraisement filed by the Special 
Administrator in Case No. 59387 pending in the 
above-entitled court, and all other properties of 
every kind or nature owned by Utahna P. Belnap at 
the time of her death, known or unknown, or 
hereafter discovered or that may be hereafter 
acquired, shall belong to the estate of Utahna P. 
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Belnap, deceased, and as to which LeGrande L. 
Belnap and Belnap Freight Lines hereby disclaim 
and waive any interest therein. All of said 
property, real, personal and mixed, belonging to 
the estate of Utahna P. Belnap shall be distrib-
uted to the defendants, Barbara Sine, LeGrande P. 
Belnap, Arlene Waldron and Jaynie Belnap, in 
equal shares free and clear of any interest or 
claim of LeGrande L. Belnap or Belnap Freight 
Lines. 
(5) All taxes of every kind or nature that 
are due or that may hereafter become due on said 
Home ... B ... all state inheritance taxes or 
federal estate taxes that may be claimed or that 
may become payable by reason of any claim that 
said Home ... were assets of Utahna P. Belnap 
shall be paid by LeGrande L. Belnap and Belnap 
Frei ht Lines, and LeGrande L. Belna and Belna 
Freig t Lines o 1n emn1 y an agree to save t e 
estate.of Utahna P. Belnap and defendants harm-
less from any and all loss, damages, claims or 
liability on account thereof. 
(Record at 393)(Emphasis added) 
In accepting the judicial order made pursuant to the 
compromise or Stipulation of the heirs regarding the treatment 
of the home, the Bank as estate fiduciary was compelled to act 
in the best interests of the estate and of the rightful heirs 
of the estate. But such actions taken in "the best interests 
of the estate" do not bind third parties whose claims may be 
contrary to such a settlement or determination. This is 
especially true where such claims were specifically recognized 
and the Appellant expressly indemnified the representative and 
held it harmless from any liability on account thereof. The 
Bank's acts as representative of the estate are not admissions 
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against Respondent herein who appears as creditor. Appellant 
may not now claim that the acts taken in reliance on and in 
pursuance of such a Stipulation are acts which bind the Bank in 
its corporate capacity. 
VI. THE ONE-ACTION RULE DOES NOT BAR THE BANK'S 
CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF. 
In exquisite convolution, Appellant appears to assert 
variously that (1) the Bank failed to make a timely claim 
against the estate; and/or (2) that when Walker Bank as a 
special administrator petitioned the court to make payments on 
the promissory note, it did make a claim which violated the 
"one-action" rule, and thereby waived its right to the 
security; 16 and/or (3) that since the estate disclaimed the 
property, the Bank may not have the protection of Utah Code 
Ann. §75-3-803(3). 17 In short, Appellant argues that the 
Bank should have claimed against the estate, but it did not; 
16The one-action rule, as set forth in Utah Code 
Ann . § 7 8 - 3 7 - 1. provide s as f o 11 ow s : ''There can be but one 
action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of any 
rights secured solely by mortgage upon real estate which action 
must be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter." 
17utah Code Ann. §75-3-803(3) provides: 
"nothing in this section effects or prevents 
(a) any proceedings to enforce any mortgage, 
pledge or other lien upon property of the estate." 
The section generally exempts persons claiming lien 
interest in estate property from the necessity of making a 
formal claim with the estate. 
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or, that the Bank should not have claimed against the estate, 
but it did. 
The single action rule does not bar the bank's claim 
for declaratory relief herein. The estate representative's 
request for authority to pay a bona fide debt is not an action 
under Utah Code Annotated §78-37-1. This is obvious from the 
record that reflects that no one opposed the petition. (See 
Order, Record at 674.) Indeed, had there been opposition to 
the matter, it would have been set for trial and then the Bank 
would have been obliged to formulate a foreclosure action to 
collect or enforce the debt. Under the circumstances that 
existed, however, such action was unnecessary, inasmuch as 
neither Appellant nor anyone else made objections to the 
payment. 
Appellant's failure to have earlier objected is fatal 
to his argument now. This is especially so since the estate's 
payment of the delinquent amounts in fact reduced the lien upon 
the home and, thus, increased the value of the property which 
Appellant claimed. Having taken the benefit, Appellant too 
belatedly contests the propriety or effect of the payment. 
Moreover, in light of Appellant's warrants to the 
estate, a claim against the estate would have triggered a claim 
by the estate against Appellant to defend and indemnify. The ~ 
case then would have come full circle. ~ 
-28-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
VII. APPELLANT CAN RAISE NO GENUINE ISSUE OF 
DISPUTE TO OVERCOME THE ADMITTED EVIDENCE 
AND LEGAL PRESUMPTIONS THAT VALIDATE THE 
SECOND DEED. 
A. The Standard for Summary Judgment. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that summary judgment shall be rendered 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to inter-
rogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact, and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. 
Under the standards for statutory construction the precise 
wording, and each and every word, of the rule must be given 
significance. The terms "genuine" and "material" are signifi-
cant. The terms "genuine" and "material" prevent a litigant 
from defeating summary judgment by raising facts or issues 
which are irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible at trial. The 
term "genuine" logically encompasses the evidentiary standards 
or burdens which the resisting party must meet under the law of 
the particular case. 
The second ·deed dated November 10, 1952, which 
describes the property as Lot 6, Indian Hills sub-division B-1 
was recorded on June 15, 1954. 
Because the deed was recorded, Appellant must prove 
its invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. Controlled 
Receivables, Inc. v. Harmon, 17 U.2d 420, 413 P.2d 807 (1976). 
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Although Respondent admits the signature of Ida Belnap 
is not genuine, it submits that such fact, standing alone, does 
not invalidate the whole conveyance. And, the evidence which 
Appellant adduces ~o prove the entire forgery is either 
inadmissible or self-serving. In similar cases this court has 
affirmed summary judgment against the person attacking recorded 
deeds. See Controlled Receivables, Inc., supra. Summary 
judgment is proper here because Appellant has failed to adduce 
his own clear and convincing evidence that the second deed is 
invalid and has failed to address the abundant evidence which 
supports the deed's validity. 
B. The Defects of the First Deed. 
The property description under the first deed does not 
exactly coincide with the dedicated Lot 6. (See Appendix A to 
this brief). It has not been determined how much difference 
these variances between the deed under which Appellant claims 
and the Plat make in terms of actual acreage. It is 
demonstrated, however, that the shape of the property described 
on the deed is not the same as the shape on the Plat. The 
effect of the differences is that some property under one of 
the descriptions will appear as a dedicated street under the 
other. 
Examination of the first deed under which Appellant 
claims discloses that the purported notary public who 
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supposedly notarized the signature of Henry and Ida Belnap on 
August 23, 1951 stated on the deed that his commission expired 
January 6, 1951. There was then no proper acknowledgement of 
the alleged signatures on that deed because the document on its 
face indicates it was not taken before a commissioned notary. 
The deed was, therefore, unrecordable. Utah Code Annotated, 
57-3-1. C.f. Norton v. Fuller, 68 Utah 524, 251 P. 29 (1926). 
The Plat for Indian Hills B-1 subdivision was filed 
for record on August 22, 1952 with the Salt Lake County 
Recorder by Henry and Ida L. Belnap and others. Although the 
property claimed by Appellant was included among the property 
dedicated by the Plat, he was not one of the signatories or 
dedicators on the Plat who warranted their ownership of the 
dedicated property. However, Appellant notarized that the 
signatures of the dedicators, such an act serves as an admis-
sion to the world that Appellant made no claim to the property 
one full year following the alleged conveyance. 
The existence of the August 23, 1951 deed signed by 
Ida and Henry Belnap before an expired notary, the existence of 
the Plat which was notarized by Appellant and which contains 
variances from the deed under which he claims, the recorded 
1952 deed and the record of Appellant's own depositions 
demonstrate certain factual matters and when the logical 
inferences are followed, lead to the following conclusions: 
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1. That on August 23, 1951, Henry and Ida Belnap 
purported to convey the property described in that deded to 
LeGrande and Utahna Belnap. 
2. That by August 22, 1952, Henry, Ida and LeGrande 
Belnap realized that certain problems were presented by the 
purported conveyance: 
(a) It was not recordable because of the defect 
in the acknowledgement. 
(b) The property description thereon was not 
compatible with the survey which was taken for the 
purpose of platting and subdividing the property. 
3. That by August 22, 1952, Henry, Ida and LeGrande 
Belnap had reached the following decision: 
(a) To treat the August 23, 1951 deed as null 
and void, and to file the Plat in order to get the 
development of the subdivision under way. 
(b) To execute a new deed after the approval of 
the plat. 
(c) To place the property in Utahna's name alone. 
C. The Validity of the Second Deed. 
The deed dated November 10, 1952 carries the property 
description which comports to the plat that was by that time in 
effect. It was purportedly executed by Henry Belnap and Ida 
Belnap and purportedly conveys the property to Utahna P. 
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Belnap. Leslie King, a qualified handwriting expert states the 
signature of Henry Belnap is an authentic signature (Leslie 
King Affidavit dated October 16, 1973, Record a~ 66-75), but 
that the signature of Ida Belnap is a forgery. (Leslie King 
Affidavit dated February 1, 1974, Record at 179-188.) Ben 
Garcia, a handwriting expert retained by Appellant, agreed in 
his disposition to both of these opinions. (Ben Garcia 
Deposition dated December 18, 1973, page 24, lines 11-16, 
Record at 586.) During the deposition of Mr. Garcia, Appellant 
stated that he does not contest the authenticity of the 
signature of Henry Belnap. 18 (James S. Lowrie Affidavit 
dated February 1, 1974 Record at 176,178) Leslie King further 
states that Henry Belnap signed Ida L. Belnap's signature on 
that Deed and on three other conveyances of property in the 
same locale. (Leslie King Affidavit dated February 1, 1974, 
Record at 179-180.) 
D. Appellant's Evidence. 
Henry Belnap, has disavowed the transaction. 
Thinking, we believe, to help his son, he has disavowed his own 
signature which is verified by two handwriting experts and 
18 Additionally, at pretrial proceedings Appellant's 
counsel represented and argued that.Appellant did not contest 
the genuineness of Henry Belnap's signature, but rather whether 
Henry Belnap intended to convey to the named grantee. 
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which is admitted by his son, the Appellant. (Henry Belnap 
Affidavit dated June 5, 1973.). However, the Affidavit of 
Henry Belnap is hearsay, and will be subject to exclusion as 
evidence of the issue. Likewise, the deposition of Henry 
Belnap is hearsay - having been taken in the early stages of 
the probate case, before the Bank became party to these actions 
in its creditor corporate capacity. Thus, Appellant has no 
admissible evidence of the alleged forgery even if, despite the 
doctrine of res judicata such issues could again be litigated. 
And, in any event, the record demonstrates that 
Appellant himself and through his expert has admitted the 
authenticity of Henry Belnap's signature. Thus, H~nry's 
signature should be taken as authentic, and no genuine question 
of fact exists to the contrary. Furthermore, the expert 
evidence demonstrates that Henry also signed Ida Belnap's 
signature on the 1952 deed, as well as on other conveyances 
apparently in a normal course of dealing. 
Further facts which support the conclusion that the 
November 10, 1952 deed is a correct and valid deed and which 
Appellant has failed in his burden to overcome, are as 
follows: The November 10, 1952 deed instructs that tax notices 
be mailed to Utahna P. Belnap at 1466 Indian Hills Drive, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. It is presumed as a matter of law that tax 
notices on the property arrived at Appellant's residence for 
eighteen years, without his ever noticing that the Salt Lake 
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County Treasurer listed the property in Utahna P. Belnap's name 
alone. In the same vein, Appellant signed at least one tax 
return wherein the property was listed as Utahna P. Belnap's 
property. (Edward G. Richards Affidavit dated October 16, 
1973, Supplemental Record at 84-104) Similarly, that until 
1972 Appellant had not discovered the payment of the original 
mortgage from the funds secured by the Trust Deed transaction 
between Utahna P. Belnap and Walker Bank & Trust Company 
(LeGrande Belnap Deposition dated October 12, 1973, page 12, 
lines 18-22), is inferential of a disregard of the details of 
property ownership which even when viewed favorably to 
Appellant, is, inconsistent with a belief in ownership of the 
property. 
When the issues already considered in this brief are 
considered together, the logical conclusion is that the 
November 10, 1952 deed was a correction deed, designed to 
remedy the defect in the acknowledgment in the August 23, 1951 
deed, designed to correct the variances between the August 23, 
1951 deed and the August 22, 1952 plat; and designed to place 
the property in Utahna P. Belnap's name alone, for tax 
purposes, for credit purposes or for some other undisclosed 
reason. 
The conclusion that the 1952 deed is valid follows as 
a matter of logic, and it follows as a matter of legal 
presumption because the 1952 deed was recorded. Even were a 
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trier of fact to consider the forgery issue through the 
affidavit and deposition of Henry Belnap, Appellant cannot, as 
a matter of law, meet his burden of proof. 
CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment was proper. Appellant's arguments to 
reverse the summary judgment avoid, overlook and contort the 
dispositive facts and law. For the past eight years, Appellant 
has resisted the validity of the trust deed held by Walker Bank 
& Trust Company. During that time he has brought numerous 
actions and allegations. Now he must accept the effect of his 
own litigious spirit. The factual basis of Appellant's claims 
have been conclusively determined against him by the dismissal 
with prejudice of his related complaint in Civil No. 209266. 
He has failed to properly reserve or bring his other defenses. 
In any event, Walker Bank & Trust Company's trust deed is valid 
under this court's holding in Tracy Collins Trust Co. v. 
Goeltz. The record unequivocally demonstrates that Walker Bank 
and Trust Company is a good faith purchaser for value. 
Final~y, as a matter of law, Appellant has not and cannot meet 
his burden of proof even were the matter to go to trial. 
Summary judgment must be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 20th day of June, 1980. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
James S. Lowrie 
Robyn 0. Heilbrun 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Walker Ba~k & Trust Company 
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APPENDIX A 
(Outline of Disparities 
Between the First Deed and the Plat) 
By locating on the Plat the approximate point of 
beginning as stated in the August 23, 1951 deed the following 
disparities are found: 
1. There is a disparity in the first distance to be 
covered--the 1951 deed stating 50.95 feet and the plat stating 
50.96 feet. 
2. The 1951 deed describes an angle of 66°34'45" 
while the Plat describes an angle of 66°31'4". The distance on 
this line according to the deed is 134.10 feet, but according 
to the Plat it is 134.08 feet. 
3. The next deed description is for an angle of 
35°30'E, a distance of 12.96 feet. The corresponding Plat 
description does not state the angle, but states the distance 
to be 12.97 feet. 
4. The deed then describes a curve to the right on a 
defined radius for 159.0 feet, followed by another curve to the 
right on another radius for 50.34 feet, followed by another 
curve to the right a distance of 89.53 feet to the point of 
beginning. The Plat, however, shows a curve on a set radius 
for 128.07 feet, a curve to the right on a changed radius for 
90.04 feet and a curve to the right on another changed radius, 
a distance of 58.49 feet to the point of beginning. 
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